'Garbage' safety culture at Boeing to blame for cabin door blowout mid-flight, watchdog hears (2024)

In short:

Boeing workers and executives have appeared before the US transport safety authority investigating the Alaska Airlines cabin door incident onboard a Boeing plane.

Multiple witnesses said the safety culture at Boeing was lacking, which the transport authority chair criticised.

What's next?

The two-day hearing will inform a final report to be released by the safety watchdog at a later date.

A string of safety failures and a lack of accountability were behind the Boeing Alaska Airlines door plug emergency, the US transport safety authority has heard in hearings into the incident.

Throughout a two-day hearing into the reasons behind the Flight 1282 incident, Boeing was repeatedly criticised for its lack of safety and accountability throughout the airplane production process.

Boeing factory workers gave evidence to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) saying they were pressured to work too fast and asked to perform jobs that they weren't qualified for, including opening and closing the door plug that later blew off the 737 MAX jet.

The NTSB and Boeing said officials still have not determined who removed and reinstalled that plane's door plug during production.

A Boeing door installer, who was not named alongside other workers, said he was never told to take any shortcuts but everyone faced pressure to keep the assembly line moving.

"That's how mistakes are made. People try to work too fast," he told investigators for the transport safety authority.

The panel that blew off the Boeing 737 Max on January 5 was made and installed by a supplier, Spirit AeroSystems.

'Garbage' safety culture at Boeing to blame for cabin door blowout mid-flight, watchdog hears (1)

It was removed at a Boeing factory so that workers could repair damaged rivets, but bolts that help secure the door plug weren't replaced.

Another member of the Boeing door crew said workers got no special training for door plugs and should not have been asked to open or close the panels.

Boeing, which has vowed to make key quality improvements, faced extensive questions about the production of the accident-hit MAX 9 and lack of paperwork documenting the removal of the door plug.

Boeing workers at the factory in Renton, Washington, have "been put in uncharted waters to do everybody's dirty work because no one wants to touch it," the second worker told investigators.

The worker described Boeing's safety culture as "garbage. Nobody's accountable".

The workers' accounts were among more than 3,000 pages of documents released by the NTSB into the accident, which left a gaping hole in the plane and created decompression so violent that it blew open the co*ckpit door.

'Chaos' but no fatalities

"It was chaos," the Alaska Airlines co-pilot told investigators about the moment the door plug blew out from the plane's fuselage.

The accident occurred minutes after take-off from Portland, Oregon, as the plane flew at 4,800 metres.

'Garbage' safety culture at Boeing to blame for cabin door blowout mid-flight, watchdog hears (2)

Oxygen masks dropped during the rapid decompression, and several phones and other objects were swept through the hole in the plane.

Several passengers were injured in the incident, but the aircraft landed safely with all 171 passengers and six crew on board.

A flight attendant described a moment of terror when the door plug blew out.

"And then, just all of a sudden, there was just a really loud bang and lots of whooshing air, like the door burst open," the flight attendant said.

"Masks came down, I saw the galley curtain get sucked towards the cabin."

The door plug was later found in a science teacher's backyard in Portland.

The plane had been in service for just eight weeks.

Following the incident, the plane model was grounded for two weeks, a ban on Boeing expanding production was announced by the federal aviation authority, and a criminal investigation began into the company.

Company executives called to answer

NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy on Tuesday criticised the plane maker's safety culture, asking why it had not made improvements earlier.

"The safety culture needs a lot of work," Ms Homendy said.

The plane manufacturer said it planned to make design changes to prevent future blowouts.

Boeing's senior vice president for quality Elizabeth Lund said the company hopes to implement the changes within the year and then to retrofit across the fleet.

"They are working on some design changes that will allow the door plug to not be closed if there's any issue until it's firmly secured," Ms Lund said.

Ms Lund said two Boeing employees who were likely involved in the opening of the door plug have been placed on paid administrative leave.

Doug Ackerman, vice president of supplier quality for Boeing, said the company has 1,200 active suppliers for its commercial airplanes and 200 supplier quality auditors.

Ms Lund said on Tuesday Boeing is still building less than 30 MAX planes a month — below the 38 it is allowed to produce.

"We are working our way back up. But at one point I think we were as low as eight," she told the hearing.

The hearings are reviewing key issues, including 737 manufacturing and inspections, safety management and quality management systems, federal oversight, and issues surrounding the opening and closing of the door plug.

Last month, Boeing agreed to plead guilty to a criminal fraud conspiracy charge and pay a fine of at least $US243.6 million ($371.3 million) to resolve a Justice Department investigation into two 737 MAX fatal crashes.

AP/Reuters

'Garbage' safety culture at Boeing to blame for cabin door blowout mid-flight, watchdog hears (2024)

FAQs

'Garbage' safety culture at Boeing to blame for cabin door blowout mid-flight, watchdog hears? ›

According to transcripts of their interviews with investigators, one worker called Boeing's safety culture "garbage." Others described intense pressure to speed up production and rush their work, with one worker saying, “That's how mistakes are made." And some said they were told to perform work they hadn't been ...

What is MCAS Boeing? ›

April 2021) The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a flight stabilizing feature developed by Boeing that became notorious for its role in two fatal accidents of the 737 MAX in 2018 and 2019, which killed all 346 passengers and crew among both flights. Movable horizontal stabilizer of the 737 MAX.

Is the solution provided by Boeing adequate? ›

This solution provided by Boeing is inadequate, because both safety systems would be required for the airplane to be safe. Pilots would not be aware of incorrect readings if there were two sensors and no disagreement alert.

Are Airbus safer than Boeing? ›

It was found that Boeing had more accidents than expected, while Airbus had less (p=0.015). In terms of fatalities Boeing has had more than expected, with Airbus less (p<0.001). Looking at just accidents, only the number of fatalities was statistically significantly different.

Did Boeing tell the FAA about MCAS? ›

Boeing did not disclose key details to the FAA of a safety system called MCAS, which was linked to both fatal crashes and designed to help counter a tendency of the MAX to pitch up.

What is the biggest problem with Boeing? ›

Five years ago Boeing faced one of the biggest scandals in its history, after two brand new 737 Max planes were lost in almost identical accidents that cost 346 lives. The cause was flawed flight control software, details of which it was accused of deliberately concealing from regulators.

What went wrong with Boeing? ›

One of Boeing's most damning decisions was a dramatic turn to outsourcing. Rather than develop aircraft in-house and outsource parts from suppliers, beginning in the 2000s around 70% of the design, engineering and manufacturing of the 737 was outsourced to more than 50 strategic partners.

What was the Boeing scandal? ›

Boeing has agreed to plead guilty to a felony fraud charge and pay a new fine in connection with two 737 Max 8 crashes that killed 346 people in 2018 and 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice said in a court filing on Sunday night.

Is 737 MAX safe without MCAS? ›

Yes it's true that it is aerodynamically stable, and could fly without MCAS just fine. But it isn't just an issue of retraining. To prevent inadvertent stalls, FAA regulations require increasing control stick force feedback - a requirement which the Boeing 737 Max did not meet without MCAS.

What was the problem with MCAS? ›

The MCAS control law, a few lines of software code in the FCC , could autonomously command nosedives, when even a single sensor failure resulted in bad data; MCAS was omitted from aircraft manuals and training, therefore flight crews had no knowledge of its existence or functioning until Boeing published a bulletin on ...

Has MCAS been removed from 737 MAX? ›

Also, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) will now only activate once and will never provide more input than the pilot can counteract using the control column alone. Pilots will continue to have the ability to override MCAS at any time.

Can Boeing MCAS be turned off? ›

The system can also be temporarily deactivated by the pilot by using the electric stabilizer trim switches on the yoke to override the MCAS.

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